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China’s Strategy in the South 
China Sea
M. TAYLOR FRAVEL
This article examines China’s behaviour in the South China Sea disputes 
through the lens of its strategy for managing its claims. Since the 
mid-1990s, China has pursued a strategy of delaying the resolution of 
the dispute. The goal of this strategy is to consolidate China’s claims, 
especially to maritime rights or jurisdiction over these waters, and to 
deter other states from strengthening their own claims at China’s expense, 
including resource development projects that exclude China. Since the 
mid-2000s, the pace of China’s efforts to consolidate its claims and deter 
others has increased through diplomatic, administrative and military 
means. Although China’s strategy seeks to consolidate its own claims, it 
threatens weaker states in the dispute and is inherently destabilizing. As 
a result, the delaying strategy includes efforts to prevent the escalation 
of tensions while nevertheless seeking to consolidate China’s claims.
Keywords: China, Spratly Islands, South China Sea, territorial disputes, strategy.
In recent years, no international maritime dispute has garnered 
more attention than the contest over the islands, reefs and waters 
of the South China Sea. The dispute involves the overlapping 
claims of six governments to territorial sovereignty and maritime 
rights, encompasses the main sea lines of communication that 
con-nect Southeast Asia with Northeast Asia, covers large ﬁshing 
grounds and may contain vast reserves of oil and natural gas. In the 
South China Sea dispute, no state attracts more attention than the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) because of its expansive claim, 
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past uses of force over islands in these waters and its growing 
naval capabilities. 
This article examines China’s behaviour in the South China Sea 
disputes through the lens of its strategy for managing its claims. 
Since the mid-1990s, China has pursued a strategy of delaying the 
resolution of the dispute. The goal of this strategy is to consolidate 
China’s claims, especially to maritime rights or jurisdiction over 
these waters, and to deter other states from strengthening their own 
claims at China’s expense, including resource development projects 
that exclude China. Since the mid-2000s, the pace of China’s efforts 
to consolidate its claim and deter others has increased through 
diplomatic, administrative and military means. Although China’s 
strategy seeks to consolidate its own claims, it threatens weaker 
states in the dispute and is inherently destabilizing. As a result, 
the delaying strategy includes efforts to prevent the escalation of 
tensions among the claimants. 
The article proceeds as follows. China’s claims and interests in 
the South China Sea, which identify the goals and context for China’s 
strategy, are examined in the next section. Then, the article describes 
China’s use of a delaying strategy since 1949 and two periods when 
force was used: in 1974 over the Crescent Group in the Paracels 
and in 1988 over Johnson Reef in the Spratlys. The following two 
sections then examine the diplomatic, administrative, and military 
components of China’s delaying strategy and efforts to manage 
tensions since the summer of 2011. Finally, the article examines the 
implications for cooperation and conﬂict in the dispute. 
China’s Claims and Interests in the South China Sea
In the South China Sea, Beijing claims territorial sovereignty over 
two groups of islands and maritime rights over related waters. The 
contemporary basis for China’s territorial claims is a statement that 
Chinese premier Zhou Enlai issued in August 1951 during the 
Allied peace treaty negotiations with Japan. In the statement, Zhou 
declared China’s sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands.1 
In September 1958, China reafﬁrmed its claim to these islands when 
it asserted rights to territorial waters during the Jinmen crisis. The 
1958 declaration marked the ﬁrst time that China linked its claims 
to territorial sovereignty with the assertion of maritime rights, in this 
case, rights to territorial waters. From the mid 1970s to the present, 
ofﬁcial government statements have used roughly the same language 
to describe China’s sovereignty claim. The claim is usually phrased 
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as: “China has indisputable sovereignty over the Spratly Islands (or 
South China Sea islands) and adjacent waters.” 
As the international maritime legal regime evolved, China began 
to codify its claims to maritime rights through the passage of domestic 
legislation. These laws harmonized China’s legal system with the 
requirements of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
In 1992, the National People’s Congress (NPC) passed a Law on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the People’s Republic 
of China, which reafﬁrmed the content of the 1958 declaration but 
contained more speciﬁc language. Following this law, China issued 
baselines for its territorial waters in 1996. In 1998, the NPC passed 
a Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf 
of the People’s Republic of China, in which it claimed additional 
maritime rights beyond those contained in the 1992 law.2 The EEZ 
law did not refer to the Paracels or the Spratlys, but, when combined 
with the 1992 law on territorial seas, it provides a basis for claiming 
maritime rights in the South China Sea. In April 2011, China afﬁrmed 
this interpretation in a note verbale to the UN Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (the Commission or CLCS) by stating 
that the Spratly Islands were “fully entitled” to territorial waters, 
an EEZ and a continental shelf.3 
The scope of China’s claims to maritime rights or jurisdiction, 
however, remains ambiguous. First, many of the land features that 
China claims in the South China Sea would not qualify as islands 
under Article 121(3) of UNCLOS and thus could not serve as the 
basis for a claim to an EEZ. China could probably claim a large 
portion of the South China Sea as an EEZ from the ﬁve largest of 
the Spratly Islands as well as Woody Island in the Paracels and 
Pratas Island (currently controlled by Taiwan).4 Such claims, however, 
would only represent a maximal position, as UNCLOS requires that 
states resolve disputes when EEZ claims overlap.
A second source of ambiguity concerns the question of historic 
rights that China might claim in the South China Sea. Article 14 of 
the 1998 EEZ law states that it “shall not affect the historic rights 
[lishixing quanyi] that the PRC enjoys”. Although some Chinese 
policy analysts have suggested that the South China Sea are historic 
waters, the 1998 law did not deﬁne the content or spatial scope of 
these historic rights.5 Moreover, no other Chinese law has described 
what these rights might encompass.6
The “nine-dashed line” (jiuduanxian) that appears on ofﬁcial 
Chinese maps of the region creates a third source of ambiguity. The 
line was initially drawn in the 1930s, ﬁrst appeared on an ofﬁcial 
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Republic of China (ROC) map in 1947, and has appeared on PRC 
maps since 1949. Neither the ROC nor the PRC has ever deﬁned 
what type of international legal claim the line depicted. To this day, 
the line remains undeﬁned. For example, although China included 
a map with the nine-dashed line in a note verbale to the CLCS in 
May 2009, it never deﬁned the line or claimed historic rights that 
some scholars argue that the line indicates.7 
If China’s ofﬁcial statements and laws are taken at face value, 
then only one interpretation of the line may be possible: it depicts 
China’s claim to the islands and other features contained within 
the line, namely, the Paracels and the Spratlys. When China issued 
its baselines in 1996, it drew baselines around the Paracels but not 
the Spratlys. This act suggests that China intends to proceed with 
its claims to maritime rights (but not territorial sovereignty) in the 
South China Sea through UNCLOS, fulﬁlling foreign minister Qian 
Qichen’s 1995 pledge.8 If the “nine-dashed line” represented anything 
other than a claim to the enclosed land features from which China 
claims maritime rights, then China would had have no need to 
claim territorial waters in 1958 or to draw baselines around features 
such as the Paracels that were located within the dashed line. As 
Daniel Dzurek has observed, the delimitation of baselines around the 
Paracels is “logically inconsistent” with a claim to historic waters 
or other interpretations of the line.9 
The unwillingness or inability of the Chinese government to 
deﬁne the line, however, creates space for various actors to offer 
competing interpretations of the line.10 The South Sea Regional 
Fisheries Administration Bureau (SSRFAB), for example, describes 
its operations to protect Chinese ﬁshermen as occurring within a 
“traditional boundary line” (chuantong jiangjie xian).11 The People’s 
Liberation Army’s (PLA) ofﬁcial newspaper, the Jiefangjun Bao, 
occasionally refers to China’s “traditional maritime boundary” 
(chuantong haijiang xian) in the South China Sea.12 Since the 
1980s, various maritime actors, including the People’s Liberation 
Army Navy (PLAN) and the State Oceanographic Administration’s 
Marine Surveillance Force, have all dispatched vessels to Johnson 
Shoal, a submerged feature that is viewed as the southern tip of 
China’s claim in the South China Sea. In fact, states under UNCLOS 
cannot claim sovereignty over subsurface features independent of a 
land feature. Nevertheless, the symbolism of this act was consistent 
with a broad interpretation of the “nine-dashed line”. 
China pursues several interests through its claims to territorial 
sovereignty and maritime rights in the South China Sea. As former 
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PLAN Commander Admiral Liu Huaqing observed, “whoever controls 
the Spratlys will reap huge economic and military benefits”.13 
Economically, jurisdiction over these waters would give China 
access to the maritime resources of the South China Sea, especially 
hydrocarbons and ﬁsh. Chinese sources indicate that there may be 
105 billion barrels of hydrocarbon reserves around the Spratlys, 
while the South China Sea accounts for a substantial portion of 
China’s annual catch of ﬁsh.14 The majority of Chinese trade also 
ﬂows through these waters, including 80 per cent of China’s oil 
imports.15 Militarily, the South China Sea forms a maritime buffer 
for the provinces of southern China and would be a key theatre of 
operations in a conﬂict over Taiwan with the United States. Any effort 
to blockade China in wartime would also occur in these waters.
Whether China has labelled the South China Sea as “core interest” 
equivalent to Tibet or Taiwan attracted a great deal of attention in 
2010. The New York Times reported in April 2010 that China had 
described the South China Sea as a core interest.16 Although it 
was discussed in several private meetings between US and Chinese 
ofﬁcials, no senior Chinese leader has ever publicly described the 
South China Sea as a core interest, unlike Tibet or Taiwan.17 The 
only exception appears to be an English-language article published 
by the Xinhua News Agency in August 2011.18 The article described 
China’s sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and 
their territorial waters as “part of China’s core interests”, but not 
the South China Sea itself.
Do China’s claims contain room for negotiation? In the author’s 
opinion the answer is yes. When China issued its baselines in 
1996 it did not draw baselines around any of the Spratly Islands. 
China also did not draw baselines around other disputed areas, 
including the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan. This suggests recognition 
of disputes and of the possibility that China might compromise in 
some fashion in the future. China did not, therefore, “tie its hands” 
or “burn bridges” by issuing baselines around features or in areas 
where negotiations might occur. More generally, China has also 
compromised in other territorial disputes and in the delimitation of 
its maritime boundary with Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin. 
China’s Past Approach to Managing Its South China Sea Claims
In any given territorial dispute, a state can pursue one of three 
general strategies for managing its claims. First, it can pursue a 
strategy of cooperation, which excludes threats or the use of force 
02 Taylor.indd   296 11/30/11   3:23:53 PM
China’s Strategy in the South China Sea 297
and involves an offer to either transfer control of contested land or 
drop claims to an existing piece of territory. Second, by contrast, 
a state can pursue a strategy of escalation, engaging in coercive 
diplomacy to achieve a favourable outcome at the negotiating table 
or using force to seize contested land. Finally, a state can adopt a 
delaying strategy, which involves maintaining a state’s claim to a 
piece of land but neither offering concessions nor using force. In 
essence, a delaying strategy is premised on maintaining existing 
claims in a dispute.19 
Most studies of territorial disputes examine periods of cooperation 
or escalation. For good reason, they reﬂect moments when disputes 
may be resolved or when armed conﬂict might erupt. The delaying 
strategy, however, is the most common one that states pursue. 
States may pursue a delaying strategy for various reasons. First, if 
a state is weaker militarily than its opponent, a delaying strategy 
allows it to buy time to strengthen its position and achieve a more 
favourable outcome in the future, either at the negotiating table 
or on the battleﬁeld. Second, if a dispute is seen as intractable 
and difﬁcult to settle, a delaying strategy can emerge as a form of 
conﬂict management. Third, a delaying strategy can allow a state 
to consolidate its claim and strengthen its control over disputed 
territory. If a state occupies a piece of contested land, the passage 
of time strengthens a state’s claim in international law. A state can 
also take actions to assert its claims, not just in terms of diplomatic 
statements, but also by using civilian or military actors to demonstrate 
and exercise sovereignty over a certain area.
Since the establishment of the PRC, Beijing has usually pursued 
a delaying strategy to manage its various claims in the South China 
Sea. Beijing began to establish a presence in the South China Sea 
shortly after the founding of the PRC.20 In 1950, China occupied 
Woody (Yongxing) Island, which is part of the Amphitrite Group 
in the western portion of the archipelago. At the time, China did 
not occupy any features in the Crescent Group to the east, but its 
ﬁshermen frequently operated in the area. In 1959, however, South 
Vietnam moved to assert control over the Crescent Group, detaining 
and evicting Chinese ﬁshermen. Until 1974, Beijing pursued a delaying 
strategy towards the government of South Vietnam, driven largely by 
the need to strengthen its position in the Amphitrite Group and to 
bolster its naval capabilities to defend its claims. China developed 
Woody Island into a small naval base and conducted routine patrols 
to the islands. Between 1960 and 1973, China conducted ﬁve patrols 
per year, on average, between Hainan and the Paracels.
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In January 1974, China consolidated its control over the Paracels 
following a brief clash with South Vietnamese forces. From the mid-
1960s, the South Vietnamese presence in the Paracels declined and 
was reduced to a weather station on Prattle Island in the Crescent 
Group. At the same time, Chinese ﬁshing vessels became more 
active in the surrounding waters. A confrontation over two Chinese 
ﬁshing vessels in January 1974 resulted in a clash between Chinese 
and South Vietnamese naval forces. Following the clash, China 
took control of the Crescent Group and completed its occupation 
of the Paracels. Nevertheless, no evidence exists that China had 
planned to adopt an escalation strategy. Instead, China appears to 
have been waiting to occupy the islands when South Vietnam was 
defeated because North Vietnam had acknowledged China’s claims 
to the Paracels and the Spratlys in a series of diplomatic notes in 
1956 and 1958.21 
Even after consolidating control over the Paracels, China’s 
position in the South China Sea remained weak. Despite its 1951 
and 1958 claims to the Spratly Islands, China did not occupy any 
of these features. Moreover, by the late 1970s, Taiwan, Vietnam, 
and the Philippines had occupied almost twenty islands and reefs 
between them. As a result, China continued with a delaying strategy 
while it improved its naval capabilities to project power over the 
Spratly Islands. 
China switched to an escalation strategy in the mid-1980s. 
Following the growing interest in maritime rights in Asia in the 
early 1980s, as well as the continued occupation of features by 
other claimants, China’s leaders decided in early 1987 to establish a 
permanent position in the region by occupying nine vacant features. 
The plan was executed at the end of January 1988, when a PLAN 
task force arrived at Fiery Cross (Yongshu) Reef. The Chinese move 
sparked a race with Vietnam to seize other unoccupied reefs in the 
area. On 14 March 1988, after China had occupied three features, a 
deadly clash occurred over Johnson (Chigua) Reef, in which seventy-
four Vietnamese were killed. When the smoke had cleared, China 
controlled six of the nine features in the original plan. 
China’s entry into the Spratlys sparked a new period of instability 
and competition in the South China Sea. Claimant states occupied 
additional features and increased their military presence. The race to 
strengthen positions culminated with China’s occupation of the aptly 
named Mischief (Meiji) Reef in late 1994. Afterwards, China returned 
to a delaying strategy to consolidate its position while managing the 
diplomatic blowback, as the regional reaction to China’s occupation 
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of Mischief Reef appeared to catch Chinese leaders by surprise.22 
For the next decade, China maintained a delaying strategy while 
actively seeking to manage the diplomatic costs of its assertiveness. 
In 1995, China and the Philippines signed a code of conduct. In 
2002, China and ASEAN signed the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea (DoC). In 2005, China reached a 
joint seismic survey agreement with the Philippines and Vietnam 
covering a portion of the South China Sea. Following controversy 
in the Philippines over the agreement, it lapsed in 2008.23 
In sum, China’s strategy for managing its claims in the South 
China Sea has emphasized delaying settlement of the underlying 
disputes with the occupation of contested features at particular 
points in time to strengthen its position. Until the 1980s, the main 
driver of delay was China’s limited naval capabilities. After China 
strengthened its position in the Spratlys through the occupation of 
seven features between 1988 and 1994, the principal goal of delay 
has been the consolidation of China’s position.
China’s Current Strategy in the South China Sea
Following China’s ratiﬁcation of UNCLOS in 1996, the competition 
to assert and exercise maritime rights has become a more prominent 
feature in the South China Sea disputes. Within this new context, 
China’s strategy of delaying the settlement has emphasized strengthening 
China’s own claim to maritime rights, especially its ability to exercise 
jurisdiction over the contested waters, and to deter other claimant 
states from further strengthening their own maritime claims. China 
seeks to prevent any development activities such as hydrocarbon 
exploration that excludes China and to ensure that it participates 
in any development that occurs. China also wants to ensure that it 
will be able to negotiate from a position of strength. The diplomatic, 
administrative and military components of this strategy are described 
below. The implementation of China’s strategy has often occurred in 
response to the actions of other claimants in the dispute.
Before discussing China’s strategy, two elements should be 
noted. By choosing delay, China has opted not to pursue a strategy 
of escalation of seizing disputed features from other states or 
compelling them to abandon their own claims to maritime rights. 
Instead, the strategy seeks to consolidate China’s ability to exercise 
jurisdiction over the waters that it claims. Because the strategy 
seeks to consolidate China’s claims, it weakens the position of other 
states and is destabilizing. Consistent with the logic of the security 
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dilemma, actions by one state to consolidate its claim will be viewed 
as threatening by the other claimants, especially when such actions 
are undertaken by the strongest state in the dispute.
The Diplomatic Component
As part of its delaying strategy, China has used the diplomatic 
instrument of statecraft in several different ways. First, China maintains 
that it is open to negotiations. Chinese leaders have repeated foreign 
minister Qian Qichen’s 1995 statement that “all disputes should be 
resolved by peaceful means on the basis of the provisions of the 
international law, including the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of 
the Sea [sic].”24 Nevertheless, China calls for bilateral talks with each 
claimant, not multilateral ones. This position supports the delaying 
strategy because China knows that other claimants are reluctant to 
accept these terms. China can indicate a willingness to negotiate 
without actually having to talk and instead defer resolution of the 
dispute to buy time to consolidate its claims.
Second, as a routine matter, China responds to the sovereignty 
and maritime rights claims of other states. International law 
demands that states actively maintain their claims, especially when 
challenged by other states. Typically, China responds through a 
statement issued by the Foreign Ministry. Figure 1 demonstrates the 
number of times that China’s territorial claims in the South China 
Sea have appeared in the Renmin Ribao. If diplomatic activity can 
serve as an indicator of the intensity of a dispute, then this ﬁgure 
suggests that the current period has not yet reached the levels of 
instability witnessed in the early 1990s.
Diplomacy has played a prominent role in China’s strategy 
following the May 2009 deadline for submissions to the CLCS. 
The Commission is tasked with reviewing and qualifying technical 
submissions by states for claims to the outer limits of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. If a land or maritime dispute exists, 
however, then the rules of UNCLOS require that the Commission 
“shall not consider and qualify a submission made by any of the 
States concerned in the dispute”. As a result, all claimants to maritime 
rights in the South China Sea have strong incentives to challenge 
the continental shelf submissions that overlap with their own claims. 
Accordingly, China objected to Vietnam’s submission and to the joint 
Vietnamese-Malaysian submission to prevent the Commission from 
qualifying these claims. Claims and counter-claims were then issued, 
elevating the level of tension in the South China Sea.25 
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Third, China has used diplomacy to prevent commercial activity 
in disputed waters. In the mid-2000s, Vietnam increased its efforts 
to develop its offshore petroleum industry in cooperation with 
foreign oil companies. In response, China issued eighteen diplomatic 
objections to foreign oil companies involved in exploration and 
development projects (see Table 1) between 2006 and 2007. In 2006, 
for example, the Indian oil company Oil and National Gas Corporation 
(ONGC) signed a production-sharing contract with PetroVietnam 
for blocks in the Phu Khanh basin. In its demarche to ONGC, 
China asserted that development activities by third parties in the 
South China Sea were illegal.26 Similarly, in April 2007, when 
asked about Vietnam’s plan to develop a natural gas pipeline in 
the Nam Con Son basin with British Petroleum, a Foreign Ministry 
spokesmen stated that “Any unilateral action taken by other 
countries in the waters infringes on China’s territorial sovereignty, 
sovereign rights and interests and jurisdiction, and thus is illegal 
and invalid.”27
Figure 1
Claims to the South China Sea Islands in the People’s Daily 
(1970–2010)
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By objecting to these projects, China sought to defend its maritime 
rights in the face of a perceived challenge and to deter foreign oil 
companies from engaging in exploration and development activities 
with other claimants. During this time, energy prices were rising as 
China continued to import unprecedented amounts of oil and natural 
gas. Moreover, China was in the midst of implementing a 2005 joint 
seismic survey agreement signed with the Philippines and Vietnam in 
an area around the disputed islands, which it hoped would serve as 
the basis for a broader joint development effort. In July 2008, reports 
surfaced the Chinese diplomats had started to threaten foreign oil 
companies with a loss of business in China. According to the South 
China Morning Post, Chinese diplomats in Washington, D.C. “made 
repeated verbal protests to ExxonMobil executives in recent months, 
and warned them that its future business interests on the mainland 
could be at risk”.28 In June 2007, China warned BP of “economic 
consequences” if it did not halt work in one of the disputed blocks.29 
Nevertheless, the effect of these protests and threats were uneven. 
In 2009, BP sold its stake in the contested blocks, apparently in 
response to pressure from China. Chevron reduced its stake in Block 
122 to twenty per cent, but has increased its investment in other 
blocks in Vietnam that China does not contest. Other companies 
listed in Table 1 remain active in Vietnam, including oil majors 
such as Exxon, which signed additional contracts with Vietnam in 
July 2009 in areas that China contests.30 
The Administrative Component
The most noteworthy element of China’s delaying strategy has 
been a greatly enhanced effort to exercise jurisdiction over the 
waters that it claims through the activities of civil maritime law 
enforcement agencies. Such efforts have often occurred in response 
to the commercial activity of actors from other claimant states, 
especially in the area of ﬁshing and hydrocarbon exploration and 
development.
Fishing
To exercise its maritime rights, China in the last decade has 
strengthened its ability to supervise ﬁshing within the waters that 
it claims. The principal actor tasked with this mission is the South 
Sea Region Fisheries Administration Bureau (SSRFAB, nanhaiqu 
yuzhengju), which is part of the Bureau of Fisheries Administration 
within the Ministry of Agriculture. The ﬁsheries administration 
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supervises China’s ﬁshing industry, including the management of 
ports, protection of ﬁshermen at sea, and enforcement of relevant 
laws such as ﬁshing bans and quotas. The SSRFAB, however, has 
an additional task. According to its website, it is “responsible for 
the comprehensive management of the waters of the Spratly Islands” 
and “organizes and implements the garrisoning of the Spratly reefs, 
ﬁsheries management, and aquaculture development”.31 The SSRFAB 
acquired this role in 1994 when the Ministry of Agriculture began to 
organize law enforcement cruises (xunhang) in the waters around the 
Spratly Islands. In the same year, the SSRFAB began to permanently 
station (jushou) personnel on Mischief Reef following its occupation 
by China.32 
Within the SSRFAB, two different units are responsible for 
maritime law enforcement activities. The principal unit is a regional 
one, the China South Sea Fisheries Administration Contingent 
(zhongguo nanhai yuzheng zongdui), whose ships fall under the 
direct control of the SSRFAB and operate around the Paracels and 
the Spratlys. One ship, the Yuzheng 309, is based at a ﬁsheries 
administration station on the Paracels. Today, the South Sea Contingent 
has seven ships. These include the largest vessel in the Bureau of 
Fisheries Administration, the Yuzheng 311 (a retroﬁtted submarine 
salvage and rescue ship from the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet that 
displaces 4,600 tons), the purpose-built Yuzheng 310 (with a landing 
pad for a helicopter that displaces 2,500 tons), three 1,000-ton ships 
and two 300-ton ships. In addition, local ﬁshery administration 
departments under the SSRFAB in Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan 
have a total of sixteen patrol vessels that displace between 100 and 
500 tons.33 They operate in the EEZs adjacent to these provinces, 
but also sometimes around the Paracels.34
The main activity for ﬁshery administration vessels is patrols 
or what ofﬁcial documents call “cruises” (xunhang). Following the 
passage of China’s EEZ law in 1998, the ﬁsheries administration 
began to conduct cruises at greater distances from the mainland coast, 
including in the South China Sea. Between 2005 and 2009, the number 
of days in which SSRFAB vessels were at sea increased from 477 to 
1,235.35 In 2008, for example, the four largest ships from the SSRFAB 
conducted a total of ﬁfteen cruises that lasted for around twenty-seven 
days on average.36 As the vessels often operate in pairs, the total 
number of cruises was probably lower, perhaps seven or eight. The 
purpose of these cruises is to enforce domestic ﬁshing laws such as 
quotas for catches, provide aid and assistance to the Chinese ﬁshing 
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ﬂeet, escort (huyu) Chinese vessels in disputed waters, and prevent 
foreign ships from operating in Chinese waters.
To exercise China’s maritime rights, ﬁsheries administration vessels 
often detain foreign ﬁshing boats and their crews operating in waters 
that China claims. Perhaps because of the implementation in 2004 
of the 2000 Chinese-Vietnamese agreement that limited ﬁshing in the 
Gulf of Tonkin, the number of Vietnamese ships operating in the 
waters around the Paracel Islands began to increase in 2008. From 
China’s perspective, these Vietnamese ships were directly challenging 
China’s claim to sovereignty over the islands as well as its claims 
to maritime rights. In 2009, the SSRFAB organized eleven special 
operations (zhuanmen xingdong) around the Paracels, each of which 
lasted for about twenty-ﬁve days.37 The same year, China expanded 
the duration of a summertime unilateral ﬁshing ban above twelve 
degrees north that had been implemented since 1999 and linked the 
dispatch of SSRFAB vessels to enforce this ban with the exercise 
of China’s maritime rights.38 
The combination of increased Vietnamese ﬁshing activity and a 
strengthened SSRFAB resulted in a growing number of confrontations 
at sea. In 2008 and 2009, SSRFAB vessels confronted and “expelled” 
(qugan) 135 and 147 foreign boats, respectively, most of which were 
likely Vietnamese.39 Some of these confrontations have been deadly. 
In addition, China began detaining Vietnamese ﬁshing boats and 
their crews, sometimes levying a ﬁne or even conﬁscating the boat. 
A Vietnamese newspaper reported that between 2005 and October 
2010 China had detained 63 ﬁshing boats with 725 men.40 Roughly 
half of these detentions occurred in 2009, when Vietnamese sources 
indicate that China detained or seized 33 boats and 433 ﬁshermen.41 
Total numbers for 2010 are unavailable, but they appear to be 
much lower, around seven.42 The practice of detaining Vietnamese 
ﬁshing boats halted in 2011, but China continues to conﬁscate the 
catches of ships it claims are operating in Chinese waters around 
the Paracels.43 
In addition to policing the waters that China claims, vessels from 
the ﬁsheries administration also seek to protect Chinese ﬁshermen 
when challenged by ships from other states. According to one Chinese 
source, more than 300 incidents in which Chinese trawlers were 
ﬁred upon, detained, or driven away have occurred since 1989. In 
2009, for example, Vietnamese vessels reportedly ﬁred three times 
on Chinese boats, wounding three Chinese ﬁshermen. Also in 2009, 
ten Chinese trawlers reportedly were seized.44 
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Hydrocarbon Exploration
A similar dynamic to assert authority over commercial activity in 
waters where China claims maritime rights involves the exploration 
activities of oil companies. As discussed above, Vietnam’s development 
of offshore oil and natural gas sparked demarches and at least a 
few threats from China against foreign energy companies between 
2006 and 2008. In the ﬁrst half of 2011, China interfered with 
seismic surveys conducted by Vietnam and the Philippines within 
their claimed EEZs. In this series of confrontations, the principal 
state actor has been the Marine Surveillance Force (MSF, haijian 
budui) under the State Oceanographic Administration. Similar to the 
ﬁsheries administration, one mission of the MSF is to “safeguard 
maritime rights and interests” in addition to enforcing Chinese laws 
regarding maritime affairs.45 The South China Sea branch of the MSF 
was established in 1999 with responsibility for the waters adjacent 
to Macau, Hong Kong, Guangdong, Hainan and the disputed islands, 
and it now has thirteen ships. According to the State Oceanographic 
Administration, the MSF started regular (dingqi ) law enforcement 
cruises to “protect rights” in 2006.46 In April 2010, for example, 
MSF vessels conducted a cruise in the southern portion of the South 
China Sea, dropping a sovereignty marker on James Shoal.47
The scope and frequency of MSF patrols in the South China Sea 
are not available in open sources. In the ﬁrst half of 2011, however, 
MSF ships were involved in two separate incidents in which they 
challenged and disrupted seismic survey activities by Vietnam and 
the Philippines. A third incident involved Chinese ﬁshing boats and 
SSRFAB vessels. The ﬁrst incident occurred in March, when two 
MSF vessels “expelled” (ganqu) the Veritas Voyager, a vessel which 
was conducting a seismic survey for Forum Energy in a Philippine 
exploration block near Reed Bank in the northwestern portion of the 
Spratly Islands. According to Philippine reports, the MSF vessels 
aggressively manoeuvred around the ship and forced it to leave the 
area.48 The second incident occurred in late May, when an MSF 
ship cut across the stern of the seismic survey vessel Binh Minh 2 
owned by PetroVietnam and severed its towed cable. According 
to Vietnamese sources, three MSF vessels had been shadowing the 
Binh Minh 2, which was operating 120 nautical miles off the coast 
of central Vietnam.49 A third related incident occurred in early 
June, but accounts differ. According to Vietnam, a Chinese ﬁshing 
boat with a “specialized cable-slashing device” became ensnared 
in the towed cables of the Viking II, a Norwegian ship that was 
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surveying an exploration block off the coast of southern Vietnam 
in the southwestern portion of the South China Sea.50 According 
to China, the ﬁshing boat’s net became tangled with the cables of 
the Viking II, suggesting that poor seamanship might be to blame.51 
All three incidents occurred after survey activity by other claimants 
increased. The Philippines initiated a new survey of Reed Bank 
in February 2011 just before the 2 March incident. The incidents 
involving Vietnam occurred following new surveys that had begun 
in March.
The strategic implications of these confrontations should be 
noted. First, the severing of cables represented an escalation of 
China’s efforts to exercise and enforce its maritime rights. No similar 
incidents had been reported in previous years, though after the May 
incident a Vietnamese ofﬁcial stated that similar acts had occurred 
in 2010 (but were not reported in the press at the time).52 Second, 
the ofﬁcial response to the May incident from China’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) suggests that the cable-cutting was intended 
to deter Vietnam from asserting its claims and bolster China’s own 
claim to jurisdiction over these waters. The day after the incident, 
the MFA spokesperson stated that “The law enforcement activities 
by Chinese maritime surveillance ships against Vietnam’s illegally 
operating ships are completely justiﬁed” [emphasis added].53 By 
contrast, the MFA’s response to the June incident indicated that it 
might have been unintended. Third, the location of the incidents 
suggests that they were designed to signal China’s maximal claims 
to maritime rights. All were located near the limits of a hypothetical 
200-nautical miles EEZ that China could claim in the South China 
Sea from the ﬁve largest features of the Spratly Islands. 
The Military Component
The military instrument of statecraft has played a secondary and 
indirect role in China’s delaying strategy in the South China Sea. 
China has used displays of its modernizing naval capabilities in 
patrols and training exercises to bolster China’s ability to defend 
its claims and to deter others from challenging China. Nevertheless, 
China has not used force to seize contested features or expel other 
countries from the features that they occupy. 
Modernization of the South Sea Fleet
The ﬁrst way in which China’s military forces have been used to 
consolidate China’s claim is the strengthening of the PLAN’s South 
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Sea Fleet (SSF), which includes the South China Sea in its area 
of operations. Although the equipment in the SSF was inferior to 
both the North Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet for many decades, 
the SSF now boasts some of the PLAN’s most capable surface 
combatants, including five of the seven modern destroyers that 
China has developed indigenously in the last ten years.54 The SSF 
is also home to the Kunlunshan, China’s ﬁrst modern amphibious 
landing platform dock (LPD) displacing 20,000 tons and capable of 
transporting one battalion of marines.55 All six ships have participated 
in at least one escort mission in the Gulf of Aden since 2008 (in 
addition to modern Jiangkai II class frigates from the SSF). Reﬂecting 
its relative capabilities within the PLAN, the SSF has organized half 
of the more than ten ﬂotillas to the Gulf of Aden. 
In addition to receiving some of the PLAN’s most modern vessels, 
the SSF’s infrastructure has also been upgraded. Most noteworthy 
has been the expansion of the Yulin naval base at Sanya on Hainan 
Island. Although the base was expanded to accommodate the new 
Jin class SSBNs developed at the end of the last decade, it also 
includes new docks for surface combatants, most of which are 
based at the SSF’s headquarters at Zhanjiang in Guangzhou. For 
many observers in the region, enlargement of the base symbolized 
the expansion of China’s naval forces and its focus on projecting 
naval power throughout the South China Sea.56 The main reason for 
the expansion of the Yulin naval base, however, was to strengthen 
China’s nuclear deterrent (by serving as a base for SSBNs) and to 
house its expanding submarine ﬂeet (which would play a crucial 
role in a Taiwan conﬂict). Nevertheless, given its location on Hainan 
Island, China’s southernmost province, it also reﬂected the new 
capabilities that China could bring to bear in the South China Sea 
disputes and cast a long shadow over the region.
Patrols and Training Exercises in the South China Sea
Training exercises have been the main way in which the PLAN 
has displayed its growing capabilities to deter other claimants. Data 
on China’s naval exercises is difﬁcult to gather because it is not 
reported systematically in the Chinese media. Nevertheless, in the 
past few years, the pace, scope and tempo of exercises in the area 
appears to have increased. 
These exercises serve to demonstrate China’s growing naval 
power and, by being conducted in the South China Sea, support its 
sovereignty and maritime rights claims. In April 2006, for example, 
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the SSF organized a task force composed of four destroyers and 
frigates, along with one supply ship, to conduct “long-distance” 
(yuanhang) training in the South China Sea. In terms of the number 
of sailors, duration, and distance, the Renmin Haijun, the PLAN’s 
ofﬁcial paper, observed that it achieved “many breakthroughs”.57 A 
turning point occurred in November 2008, when a task force composed 
of ﬁve modern, indigenously developed warships circumnavigated 
the South China Sea and conducted a series of exercises. In a 
voyage that spanned more than 5,000 nautical miles, the task 
force visited a number of disputed features, including the 
Paracels; Fiery Cross, Subi, Cuarteron and Gavin reefs; and 
the southernmost feature in the South China Sea, James Shoal. 
Commander of the South Sea Fleet Admiral Shu Shilang supervised 
the voyage and the task force conducted a number of different 
exercises, including opposition-force, live-ﬁre ammunition, counter-
terrorism, search and rescue, and coral reef assault operations, 
among others. According to the Renmin Haijun, the task force 
set new records for the actual use of weapons in the “unfamiliar 
waters” of the South China Sea, the projection of China’s marines 
in the “far seas” and opposition-force training with garrisons on 
the Spratly Islands.58
The number of noteworthy exercises in the South China Sea 
continued in 2010. In March 2010, the North Sea Fleet conducted a 
long-distance exercise with a task force of six ships, including one 
destroyer, three frigates, a tanker and a salvage vessel. The task force 
travelled from Qingdao through the Miyako Strait and then turned 
south, passing through the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the 
Philippines before stopping at Fiery Cross Reef in the South China 
Sea.59 According to the deputy commander of the North Sea Fleet, 
one purpose of the exercise was “to protect its maritime territorial 
integrity through long-distance naval projection”.60 In July 2010, the 
South Sea Fleet organized a large-scale live-ammunition exercise 
held at an undisclosed (though likely undisputed) location in the 
South China Sea that involved China’s most advanced vessels from 
all three ﬂeets. Although the exercise was held to promote the 
“transformation in military training” and the operational concept 
of “a system of systems operations”, Chief of the General Staff 
General Chen Bingde also noted the broader context in which it 
occurred at the time: “we should pay a high degree of attention 
to developments and changes in situations and tasks [to] carry out 
preparations for military struggle”.61 In November 2010, the SSF 
organized an amphibious landing exercise named Jiaolong-2010 
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involving 1,800 marines, which was observed by more than 200 
foreign military ofﬁcers.62 
Finally, the PLAN also supports the consolidation strategy by 
maintaining a small number of vessels which are permanently “on 
station” at China’s largest facilities in the Spratlys, including Fiery 
Cross and Mischief reefs. These appear to be older and smaller 
ships, mostly LSTs. In addition, the PLAN has conducted regular 
patrols in the disputed waters since around 2005. The frequency 
of these patrols and the types of vessels deployed are unknown. 
Likewise, since the start of the PLAN’s escort missions in the Gulf 
of Aden, each task force has transited through the South China Sea 
and often stops near some of the Chinese-held reefs to underscore 
Chinese sovereignty over these features.63 
Managing the Escalation of Tensions
Between 2009 and 2011, China’s efforts to consolidate its claims, 
especially to maritime rights, increased tensions in the region. The 
dispute dominated the July 2010 meeting of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), in which the United States and eleven other countries 
expressed concern about China’s claims and policies. After the May 
2011 cable-cutting incident involving three MSF ships, some analysts 
declared that China had become both assertive and aggressive.64 In 
response to the regional blowback, China began to moderate its 
efforts and prevent any further escalation of tensions. Whether this 
new moderation will endure, however, remains to be seen. 
An agreement in July 2011 between ASEAN and China on 
guidelines for implementing the 2002 DoC suggests that China has 
moved to adopt a more moderate approach to managing its claims. 
Although the implementing guidelines lack substance, they reﬂected 
an effort to use a diplomatic agreement to halt the continuation of 
tensions in the South China Sea and prevent any further escalation of 
the competition over maritime rights.65 In particular, when combined 
with other recent developments described below, they suggest that 
China may have started to moderate the manner in which it seeks to 
assert and exercise the maritime rights that it claims. By agreeing to 
the guidelines, and moderating other aspects of its behaviour, China 
has sought to reduce the role of the United States in the dispute 
and to improve its tarnished image in the region. Nevertheless, none 
of the claimants, including China, have indicated any desire to alter 
their sovereignty and maritime rights claims.
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The limitations of the content of the guidelines should be 
emphasized. First, they were designed to implement the 2002 
DoC, which itself was intended only as a first step towards a 
binding Code of Conduct (CoC) for activity in the South China Sea. 
Second, the 2002 DoC (and any resulting CoC) does not address the 
conﬂicting claims to territorial sovereignty or maritime rights and 
was intended only to manage tensions. Third, even in the context 
of implementing the DoC, the guidelines are unimpressive. They 
are limited to conﬁdence-building measures, including workshops 
on environmental protection, navigational safety, and search and 
rescue operations and transnational crime.66
Nevertheless, the signiﬁcance of the China-ASEAN agreement 
is symbolic, not substantive. The agreement indicated a desire 
by the principal antagonists, China and Vietnam, to prevent any 
further escalation of tensions. Although China and ASEAN had been 
discussing the guidelines for several years, the two sides disagreed 
over whether they would state explicitly that ASEAN would meet as 
a group (standard ASEAN practice) before holding talks with China. 
Within ASEAN, Vietnam was most adamant about the inclusion 
of this provision in the guidelines. In late June, a breakthrough 
occurred when Vietnam’s Deputy Foreign Minister Ho Xuan Son 
travelled to Beijing as a special enjoy. According to a statement 
that was released following his visit, China and Vietnam agreed to 
accelerate bilateral negotiations over maritime issues and to “boost 
the implementation of the [DoC] … so that substantial progress will 
be achieved soon”.67 China and Vietnam likely agreed to halt their 
standoff over the implementing guidelines during Ho’s trip. A few 
weeks later, Vietnam reportedly dropped its insistence that such 
language be included in the guidelines, while China agreed that 
ASEAN would continue its practice of meeting as a group before 
meeting with China (as happened at the July 2011 ASEAN meeting).68 
Although this agreement was not included in the implementing 
guidelines, it was included in the ofﬁcial summary record of the 
meeting. The diplomatic breakthrough over the guidelines allowed 
all sides to demonstrate their commitment to limiting the escalation 
of tensions.
In addition to the agreement on the guidelines, China has 
demonstrated a willingness to moderate other aspects of its delaying 
strategy in the South China Sea. As discussed above, one trend, 
especially in 2009, has been the detention of Vietnamese ﬁshing 
vessels, especially those operating near the Paracel Islands. In 
2010, the number of detentions declined substantially from 33 in 
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2009 to around seven. As of this writing in 2011, China has not 
detained and held any Vietnamese ships and crews, though the 
SSFRAB continues to confiscate the catches and equipment of 
ships operating in Chinese waters. Vietnamese sources conﬁrm this 
change in China’s rules of engagement for ﬁsheries administration 
vessels.69 The SSFRAB detentions were consistent with its domestic 
operations, as it routinely boards, inspects, ﬁnes and detains Chinese 
ﬁshing vessels in addition to foreign ones. Thus, the change in its 
approach to Vietnamese ships in 2011 can only be explained as a 
response to pressure from above to harmonize its actions with the 
requirements of Chinese diplomacy. 
More recently, top leaders have reafﬁrmed that China’s approach 
to the disputes in the South China Sea should remain based on 
Deng Xiaoping’s guideline of “sovereignty is ours, set aside disputes, 
pursue joint development”. Shortly after the July 2011 meeting of 
the ARF, the print edition of the Renmin Ribao included a full-page 
“authoritative forum” (quanwei luntan) devoted to the importance 
of pursuing joint development.70 Such a collection of essays in the 
ofﬁcial newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party on the South 
China Sea is perhaps unprecedented and was likely designed to 
“unify thought” within the party on the issue. Likewise, President 
Hu Jintao gave his own support for this approach during Philippine 
President Benigno Aquino’s visit to China in August 2011. Hu stated 
that “Before the disputes are resolved, the countries concerned 
may put aside the disputes and actively explore forms of common 
development in the relevant sea areas.”71 Hu did not apparently 
stress the ﬁrst element of Deng’s guideline emphasizing China’s 
sovereignty claims. During Vietnamese Communist Party General 
Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s trip to China in October 2011, China 
and Vietnam signed an agreement on basic principles for guiding 
the resolution of maritime issues, including the disputes over the 
Paracels and Spratlys.72 The agreement was apparently concluded 
when Dai Bingguo visited Vietnam in September 2011.73
What remains to be seen is whether the change in China’s 
behaviour will extend beyond ﬁshing to offshore petroleum and 
other sectors. The May 2011 cable-cutting incident was likely 
intended to send a signal of China’s opposition to what it views as 
Vietnam’s unilateral development of offshore petroleum. How China 
will respond to similar seismic survey work that both Vietnam and 
the Philippines plan to undertake in the future and whether it will 
continue to interfere with these operations will be a key area to 
monitor. In this regard, the cable-cutting episode may be similar to 
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the 2009 Impeccable incident, when Chinese naval, government, and 
ﬁshing ships manoeuvred dangerously around a US military survey 
ship and attempted to snag its towed cable. Following this clear 
signal of opposition to the US activity in China’s EEZ, no further 
incidents occurred. 
Conclusion and Implications
China’s commitment to its claims in the South China Sea is long-
standing and unlikely to change. A delaying strategy that seeks to 
consolidate China’s claims and deter other states from strengthening 
their own claims only raises further obstacles to future compromise. 
Although compromise over contested sovereignty or maritime rights 
is possible, it is unlikely and will only occur under a narrow set 
of circumstances. China’s emphasis on consolidation and deterrence 
seeks to maintain the status quo in terms of the control of contested 
features while strengthening China’s ability to exercise jurisdiction 
over the waters it claims. Nevertheless, although China’s strategy 
seeks to consolidate its own claims, often responding to the moves 
by other claimants, it threatens weaker states in the dispute and is 
destabilizing if unchecked or not moderated. 
Under what conditions will China switch from a strategy of 
delaying settlement to one of cooperation in which it seeks to resolve 
these disputes through negotiations and compromise? Elsewhere, I 
have argued that a state is most likely to compromise and offer 
concessions to counter internal or external threats to its security.74 
Compromise is possible because pressing a claim to another state’s 
land carries some price or opportunity cost, usually unrealized military, 
economic or diplomatic assistance. When these costs outweigh the 
value of the land at stake, compromise becomes more attractive than 
delay, and a state will trade concessions for aid from a territorial 
opponent to counter the more pressing threat that it faces. 
In the South China Sea, China should be most likely to 
compromise when improved ties with claimant states become more 
important than the islands or maritime rights being contested. 
Although such a shift is unlikely, it might occur if China seeks to 
prevent the formation of a counterbalancing coalition, especially one 
led by the United States. In this scenario, China would offer some 
concessions in the dispute to improve ties with these states. Such 
cooperation in an offshore island dispute is not unprecedented. In 
1957, Mao ordered the transfer of the disputed White Dragon Tail 
(Bailongwei) Island in the Tonkin Gulf to North Vietnam. At the 
02 Taylor.indd   313 11/30/11   3:23:58 PM
314 M. Taylor Fravel 
time, Mao hoped to strengthen his ally, Ho Chi Minh, in the broader 
context of China’s rivalry with the United States.75 
Nevertheless, compromise or concessions over maritime rights 
and especially territorial sovereignty are unlikely, as the perceived 
value of controlling the islands and waters is only likely to grow. 
Instead, China may seek to moderate the manner in which it 
seeks to pursue its claims. Such actions would include agreeing to 
multilateral escalation control mechanisms and unilateral actions such 
as a reduced presence or altered rules of engagement for Chinese 
government ships in disputed waters. Such a dynamic explains 
China’s willingness to restart talks over implementing the 2002 DoC 
in April 2010, the agreement on implementing guidelines that was 
reached in July 2011, and the diplomatic engagement of Vietnam 
and the Philippines since August 2011. 
Under what conditions will China adopt a strategy of escalation 
where it threatens or uses force? A state is more likely to use force 
when its bargaining power or position in a dispute declines. A 
state’s bargaining power consists of the amount of contested land 
that it occupies and its ability to project military power over the 
entire area under dispute. These two factors shape a state’s ability to 
control contested land and achieve a favourable negotiated settlement. 
When a state concludes that an adversary is strengthening its relative 
position in a dispute, inaction becomes more costly than threatening 
or even using force to halt or reverse its decline. 
This logic suggests several possibilities. As China continues to 
accumulate military capabilities, it will feel more conﬁdent about 
managing its claims, less threatened by other states in these disputes, 
and less likely to use force. At least in China’s past territorial 
disputes, China has been much less willing to use force against 
its weaker neighbours. What could change China’s calculations, 
however, might be improved security ties between other claimants 
and the United States. If coupled with what China might view as 
increasing assertiveness by these states in the dispute, China might 
then view its position as weakening and be more likely to use 
force. Nevertheless, the other states are so weak when compared 
to China now and in the future that even closer ties with the 
United States may not shift China’s assessment of the strength of 
its own claim. 
Two additional factors inﬂuencing the shift to a strategy of 
escalation merit consideration. First, an increase in the perceived 
value of the disputed land or maritime rights would alter the calculus 
for the use of force. This could happen, for example, if one or more 
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of the countries discovered substantial and recoverable deposits of 
petroleum near the contested islands. Under such circumstances, the 
net beneﬁts of using force, ceteris peribus, would increase. Second, 
a much stronger China may decide to use force because, put simply, 
it can. Nevertheless, China would have to weigh all the potential 
costs, especially how other regional actors will respond.
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